This two-part paper addresses the design of retail electricity tariffs for distribution systems with distributed energy resources (DERs). Part I presents a framework to optimize exante two-part tariffs for a regulated retailer who faces stochastic wholesale prices on the one hand and stochastic demand on the other. In part II, the integration of DERs is addressed by analyzing their effect on the optimal two-part tariff and the induced welfare gains. Two DER integration models are considered: a decentralized model involving behind-the-meter DERs and a centralized model with retailer-integrated DERs. It is shown that DERs integrated under either model can achieve the same social welfare and that net metering is optimal. The retail prices for both models are equal and reflect the expected wholesale prices. The connection charges differ and are affected by the retailer's fixed costs and the statistical dependencies between wholesale prices and behind-the-meter DERs. These charges are higher under the decentralized model. An empirical analysis is presented to estimate the impact of DER on welfare distribution and cross-subsidies. It shows that, with the prevailing net-metering tariffs, consumer welfare decreases with the level of DER integration. Issues of cross-subsidy and practical drawbacks of decentralized integration are also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS two-part paper studies the design of dynamic retail electricity tariffs for distribution systems with distributed renewable and storage resources. We consider a regulated monopolistic retailer who, on the one hand, serves residential customers with stochastic demands, and on the other hand, interfaces with an exogenous wholesale market with stochastic prices. In this framework, we analyze both customer-integrated and retailer-integrated distributed energy resources (DERs). Our goal is to shed lights on the widely adopted net energy metering compensation mechanism for DERs and the short-term efficiency loss implied by such prevailing retail tariffs when an increasing amount of DERs are integrated into the distribution system. Manuscript While part I [1] establishes a framework to analyze the shortterm economic efficiency of revenue adequate tariffs with connection charges, part II extends it to address the presence of DERs. In particular, part II analyses the impact of an exogenous adoption level of distributed renewable resources and energy storage on the short-term economic efficiency induced by retail electricity tariffs. Of the many services DERs can provide to customers and electric power systems, this analysis focuses on their capability to reshape load profiles.
The main contribution of part II is twofold. First, we characterize analytically the optimal revenue adequate ex-ante two-part tariff for a distribution system with renewables and storage integrated by customers or the retailer. We characterize the short-term consumer and social welfare achieved by the optimal two-part tariff under both integration models. This analysis is an application of the classical Ramsey pricing theory [2] with extensions to accommodate the multi-period integration of stochastic DERs. Second, we analyze a numerical case study based on empirical data that estimates the increasingly larger inefficiencies and interclass cross-subsidies caused by DERs when net metering tariffs with price markups are used to maintain revenue adequacy. In this context, the derived optimal two-part tariffs and a centralized DER integration model offer two alternatives to mitigate these undesirable effects.
The main results of part II are as follows. We leverage the retail tariff design framework established in [1] to accommodate the integration of DERs by customers (in a net-metering setting) and by the retailer in Section II. to accommodate the presence of customer-operated or retailer-operated in Section II. The extended framework considers heterogeneous customers with arbitrary behind-the-meter renewables and storage. Therein, we derive the optimal ex-ante two-part tariff under both DER integration models and the combined effect of this tariff and DERs on consumer and social welfare.
We find that under the optimal two-part tariff, DERs integrated under either model bring the same gains in social and consumer welfare. This is in contrast to prevailing volumetric tariffs under which the integration of DERs can increase or decrease social and consumer welfare depending critically on the integration model and the retailer's fixed costs. Indeed, we demonstrate that the two-part tariff structure is optimal in the sense that no other tariff structure -however complexcan achieve a strictly higher social welfare. This means that the two-part net metering tariff of the decentralized model is optimal as a DER compensation mechanism.
These welfare effects are explained by the structure of the optimal ex-ante two-part tariff. We show that under both integration models the derived tariff consists of an identical timevarying price and a distinct connection charge. In particular, 0885-8950 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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the time-varying price reflects the wholesale prices and their statistical correlation with the elasticity of the random demand. The optimal connection charge allocates uniformly among customers the retailer's fixed costs and additional costs and savings caused by risks and the integrated DERs. Indeed, while savings from retailer-integrated DERs reduce the connection charge, customer-integrated DERs induce slight increments or reductions caused by risks introduced by renewables. As suggested before, part II focuses on the capability of DERs to provide energy services. This restriction simplifies our exposition and analysis of current net metering practices and their relationship with the utility "death spiral" threat. In general, however, DERs have the potential to provide other distribution, transmission, and wholesale market services. Perhaps the most important of such other services are distribution network and generation capacity, ancillary services (including voltage and frequency regulation, and reactive power support), reliability, and resiliency [3] , [4] . Incorporating the value of all such services in DER compensation mechanisms -as well as any integration costs entailed by DERs-will further facilitate the efficient adoption and operation of DERs.
The theoretical analysis of DER integration is complemented in Section III with an empirical study based on publicly available data from NYISO and the largest utility company in New York City. The performance of the optimal ex-ante two-part tariffs is compared with several other ex-ante tariffs for different levels of DER penetration, under both integration models. Tariffs used as benchmarks include the optimal linear tariff and two-part flat tariffs used extensively in practice by utilities. In particular, relative to a base case with a nominal two-part flat tariff and no DERs, we estimate the efficiency gains or losses brought by tariff changes in Section III-A. Subsequently, in Section III-B, we estimate the efficiency gains or loses brought by the integration of DERs under both integration models and the various exante considered tariffs. Most notably, our results estimate that the efficiency gains brought by switching from flat to hourly pricing, which are below 1% (of the utility's gross revenue) for most relevant cases, can be more than tripled by a $10 increase in the monthly connection charge. Moreover, for the case with customer-integrated DERs, we estimate in Section III-C the indirect cross-subsidies that customers without DERs give to DER-owning customers due to net metering tariffs with markedup retail prices. All our estimations in this case study assume a stylized model for thermostatically controlled loads.
Concluding remarks and proof sketches of the main results are included in Section IV and the Appendix, respectively. Detailed proofs of all results can be found in [5] .
A. Related Work
The literature on retail electricity tariff design is extensive [6] , and there is an increasing interest in addressing the integration of DERs. We briefly discuss works that are relevant to our paper. Based on their main focus, we group these works into two categories: (i) tariff design for fixed cost recovery with DERs, and (ii) optimal demand response with DERs.
1) Tariff Design for Fixed Cost Recovery With DERs:
The general principles used in retail tariff design are briefly reviewed in [7] and more extensively in [8] , and the additional challenges brought by DERs are discussed in [9] . In the light of such challenges, current tariff design practices and broader regulatory issues are being revised in comprehensive studies to address the adoption of DERs [3] , [10] , [11] .
Research efforts to study more specific issues of DER integration such as [12] - [15] have also emerged. For instance, in [13] , the trade-off between multiple tariff design criteria is studied in a multi-objective optimization framework. An analytical approach leverages a generation capacity investment model in [15] to characterize sufficient conditions for RTP and flat tariffs to be revenue adequate. More empirical approaches are conducted in [12] , where interclass cross-subsidies and revenue shortfalls caused by net metering tariffs are estimated, and in [14] , which estimates the impact of tariff structure and net metering on the deployment of distributed solar PV.
Finally, there is an increasing volume of literature studying the "death spiral" of DER adoption [16] - [22] , which is presented as a threat on the financial viability of utilities. This threat refers to a self-reinforcing feedback loop of DER adoption involving a decline in energy sales and the persistent attempt to recover utilities' fixed costs by increasing volumetric charges. The empirical analysis in [17] , for example, models the effect that price feedback loops may have on the adoption of solar PV and concludes that it may not be significant within the next decade. In [19] , an extensive list of factors that affect the system dynamics of DER adoption is presented. It concludes that while the feedback loop is possible, it is not predetermined and can be avoided. A stylized demand model is used in [20] to argue that a minimum of price elasticity is required for the threat to be an actual problem. The work in [22] provides an estimate of the evolution of the lowest-cost configuration (namely grid only, grid+solar, or grid+solar+battery) for residential and commercial customers to satisfy their load in the long-term for a few U.S. cities.
There are still important gaps in this subject. For example, none of the works above studies the efficiency loss and, with the exception of [12] , the interclass cross-subsidies entailed by the adoption of DERs under net metering tariffs. This is precisely a focus of our work.
2) Optimal Demand Response With DERs: Many works focus on deriving optimal retail pricing schemes to induce desired electricity consumption behavior on customers with DERs such as [23] - [26] . For example, in [25] , the authors consider customer and retailer integrated renewables and storage separately in a setting similar to ours. They derive dynamic linear tariffs that maximize an objective that balances the retailer profit and customers' welfare. Unlike our work, however, none of these works consider explicitly a revenue adequacy constraint nor the use of connection charges.
II. RETAIL TARIFF DESIGN WITH DERS

A. Multiperiod Ramsey Pricing Under Uncertainty
Consider a regulator who sets a retail electricity tariff T in advance (ex-ante) to maximize the welfare of M customers over a billing cycle of N time periods, subject to a net revenue sufficiency constraint for the monopolistic retailer serving the load. Expectations are used to deal with the uncertainties that naturally arise when fixing a tariff in advance of actual usage.
To quantify the customers' welfare we use the notion of consumers' surplus, which measures the difference between the gross benefit derived from consumption and what the customer pays for it. Formally, we assume that given a tariff T , customer i consumes a profile q i (T, ω i ) ∈ R N within the N -period billing cycle contingent on the random evolution of the local state ω i = (ω i 1 , . . . , ω i N ) ∈ R N , provided that q i is purchased from the retailer. Accordingly, customer i derives an expected surplus
where T : R N → R and S i (q i (T, ω i ), ω i ) is the derived gross benefit. Collectively, customers derive an expected consumer surplus
where the expectation is taken with respect to the M -tuple ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω M ).
Similarly, the expected retailer surplus or net revenue 1 is
where λ ∈ R N is the profile of random real-time wholesale prices, q(T, ω) is the aggregated demand profile, λ q(T, ω) is the energy cost faced by the retailer, and the expectation is over the uncertain evolution of the global state ξ = (λ, ω).
Adding the consumer and retailer surplus together yields the (expected) social surplus
which quantifies the social welfare induced by a tariff T .
We can now formulate the regulator's tariff design problem as the optimization problem
where F is a constant representing the non-energy costs faced by the retailer that need to be passed on to its customers. 2 As such, (4) is a version of the Ramsey pricing problem. 3 This problem can take equivalent forms that may provide additional insight. In an alternative formulation explored in [27] and [28] 4 , the retailer maximizes its profit rs(T ) subject to certain level of surplus cs(T ) granted to customers. Another equivalent formulation maximizes the social welfare sw(T ) subject to the same revenue sufficiency constraint rs(T ) = F . The latter equivalence follows from the definition of sw(T ) in (3) and the equality constraint in (4) , which imply that the objective functions differ merely by a constant, namely, F . There are many types of tariffs that regulators can use to balance efficiency, revenue sufficiency, and other typical policy objectives. In particular, we consider ex-ante two-part tariffs 5 T (q) = A + π q with connection charge A ∈ R and time-varying price π ∈ R N . These tariffs induce an individ-
is a demand function assumed to be nonnegative, continuously differentiable in π, and with a negative definite Jacobian ∇ π D i (π, ω i ) ∈ R N ×N that satisfies the following assumption. 6 1 To facilitate our exposition and make consistent with previous works [25] , [27] , we de not to account for the fixed costs faced by the retailer in the surplus expression rs(T ), which is not standard. Instead, fixed costs are later introduced in the formulation of the regulator's tariff design problem. 2 F is meant to include delivery (e.g., infrastructure), metering, and customer service costs as well as the profits the regulated firm is allowed to earn. 3 Ramsey pricing is pricing efficiently subject to a breakeven constraint [2] . With (4), we seek to apply Ramsey pricing to a single service with time-varying, random marginal costs and temporally dependent stochastic demands. 4 See Theorem 1 and Section 2 (page 803), respectively. 5 This restriction may involve no loss of generality (see Thm. 2 below). 6 A detailed discussion on the implications of this assumption and special cases when it is satisfied can be found in part I [1] .
] is such that the Jacobian matrix ∇g(π) is negative definite (nd).
In the following sections we accommodate the integration of DERs into the tariff design framework above. To that end, we assume that either customers or the retailer have access to distributed renewable and storage resources. We model an agent's access to renewables as the ability to use a state-contingent energy profile r ∈ R N + at no marginal or fixed costs. 7 In general, we allow the power output of renewables and electricity wholesale prices to be statistically correlated. This can be seen as a practical way to accommodate such relationship while keeping wholesale prices exogenous, which avoids the need to use involved wholesale market models.
Similarly, we model access to a storage with capacity θ ∈ R + as the ability to offset energy needs with any vector of storage discharges s ∈ R N in the operation constraint set 8
We define the (arbitrage) value of the storage given a deterministic price vector π ∈ R N as
and let s * (π, θ) denote an optimal solution of (6).
In what follows, we focus on characterizing solutions to problem (4) considering DERs integrated either behind the meter by customers in a net-metering setting or by the retailer.
B. Decentralized (Behind-the-Meter) DER Integration
Suppose that customers install renewables and a battery behind the meter. Let r i (ω i ) ∈ R N and s i ∈ R N denote the energy customer i obtains from renewable resources in state ω i and from the battery, respectively, and let θ i ∈ R + represent its storage capacity. We operate in a net-metering setting where tariffs depend only on d i = q i − r i − s i , which we use to represent customer i's net-metered demand. Hence, given a tariff T (d) = A + π d, customer i chooses consumption q i k and storage operation s i k at each time k contingent on ω i 1 , . . . , ω i k to solve the multistage stochastic program
A key observation is that the linearity of two-part tariffs implies that customer i's problem (7) can be separated into two sub-problems:
subject to (7b). The former problem is equivalent to that of customers without DERs analyzed in [1] , whose solution characterizes the demand function D i (π, ω i ). As for the second sub-problem, it is clear from (6) that s * (π, θ i ) is an optimal solution. These solutions constitute an optimal solution to (7) and thus a net demand function
This fundamental separation of the customer's problem yields the following result, where we use r(ω) = M i=1 r i (ω i ) and s = M i=1 s i for notational convenience. Theorem 1: Suppose that customers have access to renewables and storage as characterized in (7) and (8) . If ∇ π D(π, ω) and λ are uncorrelated 9 , then the two-part tariff T * DEC that solves problem (4) is given by π * DEC = λ and
where A * , the connection charge in the absence of DER, would be given by A * = 1 M F + Tr(Cov(λ, D(λ, ω))) . Before discussing some implications of Theorem 1, we examine the condition that ∇ π D(π, ω) and λ are uncorrelated. This condition holds in many situations. In particular, it holds for demands that are not much affected by consumers' local randomness, such as the charging of electric vehicles and typical household appliances. It even holds for smart HVAC loads that are affected by random temperature fluctuations since their demand takes the form D(π, ω) = D(π) + b(ω), i.e., a demand with additive disturbances [27] .
The tariff T * DEC in Thm. 1 reveals the following. Letting retail prices reflect an unbiased estimate of the marginal costs of electricity (λ) maximizes social and consumer welfare. Under net metering, this implies that the retailer should buy customers' energy surplus (from DERs) at the same price that he buys energy at the wholesale market (in expectation).
The expression for A * DEC in (9) has an intuitive interpretation. It indicates that the integration of behind-the-meter DERs would require adjustments to the connection charge. These adjustments would be increments, if the integrated renewables tend to cause wholesale prices to drop (i.e., negative correlation), or decrements otherwise. In particular, these adjustments imply that the decentralized integration of DERs can either increase or decrease the consumer surplus of customers without DERs through changes in the connection charge. For the customers integrating the DERs, these adjustments to connection charges are likely to be negligible relative to the capital costs entailed by integrating the DERs.
The welfare gains brought by decentralized DERs depend critically on retail tariffs. To assess the performance of two-part tariffs in this regard we first need a point of comparison. In the absence of DERs, T * DEC reduces to the optimal ex-ante two-part tariff T * (q) = A * + π * q derived in [1] , where π * = λ under the assumption in Theorem 1. As a point of comparison, consider that in the absence of DERs and under tariff T * , customers derive an expected surplus cs 0 (T * ) = sw * 0 − F , the retailer derives rs 0 (T * ) = F , and social welfare is 
The expressions cs 0 (T * ) and cs(T * DEC ) above characterize the tradeoff between the retailer's surplus target F and consumers' surplus cs induced by the tariffs T * and T * DEC , respectively. Indeed, noting the linear dependence of A * in F , it becomes clear that in both cases the rs-cs tradeoff is linear, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . Moreover, the fact that the social welfare achieved in both cases (sw * 0 and sw(T * DEC )) does not depend on F implies that said tradeoff is not only linear but one-to-one (i.e., the Pareto fronts in Fig. 1 have slope −1). This means that while an increased net revenue target F + ΔF decreases consumer surplus in expectation, it does not decrease social surplus. Conversely, the integration of DERs behind-the-meter increases both social and consumer surplus by
in expectation regardless of the retailer's net revenue target F .
Another implication of the optimal two-part tariff T * DEC is the likely impact it would have on the rapid adoption of behindthe-meter DERs. Prevailing tariffs that rely on retail markups to achieve revenue adequacy provide an strong incentive for customers to integrate Distributed Generation (DG). This is because, under net-metering, the higher the retail prices, the more savings DG represents. By eliminating retail markups and imposing virtually unavoidable connection charges, T * DEC generally reduces such savings. Hence, T * DEC is likely to decelerate the adoption of decentralized DERs compared to the prevailing less efficient retail tariffs. This suggests that there is a tradeoff between efficiency and the rapid adoption of behind-the-meter DERs.
1) Optimality of Net Metering: We have restricted the regulator to offer net-metering two-part tariffs. There are, however, alternative mechanisms to compensate DERs that do not rely on net metering (e.g., feed-in tariffs). We argue that the regulator cannot improve upon the efficiency attained by T * DEC with more complex ex-ante tariffs under certain condition. This holds true because T * DEC induces the same efficiency attained by the social planner, which provides an upper bound to the regulator's problem (4) .
Theorem 2: Suppose that customers have access to renewables and storage. If wholesale prices λ and customers' states ω are statistically independent (i.e., λ ⊥ ω), then T * DEC is an optimal solution of (4) among the class of ex-ante tariffs.
Namely, the restriction to two-part net metering tariffs, which are simple and thus practical tariffs, imply no loss of efficiency if λ ⊥ ω. The latter condition, however, makes the result somewhat restrictive as it applies to loads not affected by customers' local randomness such as washers and dryers, computers, batteries and EV charging but not to HVAC loads or behind-the-meter solar and wind DG. Nonetheless, said condition suggests that if the net load and λ are poorly correlated (or either exhibits little uncertainty at the time the tariff is fixed) then T * DEC may have a good performance.
C. Centralized (Retailer-Based) DER Integration
As an alternative to behind-the-meter DERs, we now consider the case where the retailer installs DERs within the distribution network. To that end, suppose that the retailer has access to a renewable supply r o (ξ) ∈ R N + and a storage capacity θ o ∈ R + . Without loss of generality, we assume that the retailer determines the operation of storage before the billing cycle starts (i.e., ex-ante). 10 Assuming that the retailer operates storage to maximize his net revenue, the resulting surplus induced by a tariff T can be written as
The fact that the two last terms in (11) do not depend on T facilitates obtaining the following result since both terms simply offset the surplus target F when imposing rs(T ) = F . Theorem 3: Suppose that the retailer has access to renewables and storage as characterized in (11) . Then the two-part tariff T * CEN that solves problem (4) is given by
where A * , the connection charge in the absence of DER, would be given by
. We first note that, unlike Thm. 1, Thm. 3 does not require ∇ π D(π, ω) and λ to be uncorrelated. However, if this condition is satisfied it holds that π * CEN = π * DEC = λ. In other words, under optimally set ex-ante two-part tariffs, the integration of DERs by either customers or their retailer do not require updating prices to maintain revenue adequacy. Hence, in both cases, any potential feedback loop of DER integration on retail prices (and thus on consumption) is undermined.
In terms of the connection charge in (12) , the integration of DERs by the retailer results in reductions relative to A * . These reductions contrast with the potential increments required by customer-integrated DERs (cf., A * DEC in (9)). The underlying reason for such difference is intuitive, specially considering the identical retail prices π * CEN = π * DEC . While decentralized DERs represent savings in volumetric charges for customers (with reduced net loads), centralized DERs represent savings in electricity purchases for the retailer. Because the latter savings cannot increase the retailer surplus beyond the regulated amount F , they are allocated uniformly between customers through reductions in the connection charge. Notably, considering the capital costs entailed by investments in DERs would, at the very least, offset part of the savings perceived by the retailer. Ultimately, reductions in connection charges due to retailer-integrated DERs 10 Allowing storage operation to be contingent on partial observations of (11) would reflect not just the induced operational savings but the overall short-term and long-term net savings, which include the associated capital costs.
Unlike with decentralized DERs in general, the welfare gains brought by DERs integrated (and operated) by the retailer do not depend on retail tariffs. This is formalized by the following result.
Corollary 2: Under the tariff T * CEN , retailer-integrated DERs induce an expected total surplus sw(T *
. In Cor. 2, cs(T * CEN ) characterizes a linear one-to-one tradeoff between F and cs induced by the T * CEN . This tradeoffequivalent to the Pareto front induced by T * DEC in Fig. 1 -is characterized by the social welfare achieved by T * CEN , sw(T * CEN ). Consequently, similar to behind-the-meter DERs, the integration of centralized DERs increases both social and consumer surplus by V S (λ, θ 0 ) + E[λ r 0 (ω)] in expectation regardless of the retailer's net revenue target F .
The equivalent collective welfare effects of DERs integrated under both models (characterized by Cor. 1 and 2) are in contrast to their individual welfare effects. As suggested above, welfare gains (or losses) from decentralized DERs are captured individually by DER-integrating customers as reductions in their bills and as bill reductions or increments for all other customers due to the adjustments to the connection charge A * DEC . This allocation of welfare gains constitutes an interclass cross-subsidy between customers. Conversely, welfare gains from centralized DERs are uniformly captured by all customers as reductions in the connection charge A * CEN . Lastly, an implication of T * CEN is the likely impact it has on the adoption of DERs. The reduction in the connection charge characterized by A * CEN relative to A * is the net benefit perceived by each customer due to the integrated centralized DERs. Hence, customers should be willing to let the retailer integrate DERs even if they entail capital costs that offset a portion of said reductions in the connection charge.
III. AN EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY
In this section, we analyze a case study of a hypothetical distribution utility that faces New York city's (NYC) wholesale prices and residential demand for an average summer day. We compare the performance of several tariffs with day-ahead hourly prices at different levels of solar and storage capacity. Tariffs with day-ahead hourly prices are a particular form of exante tariffs commonly offered in a voluntary basis for residential customers [29] .
Besides the optimal two-part tariff, we study other tariff structures with two pricing alternatives (flat pricing or hourly dynamic pricing) and with daily connection charges fixed at five different levels: 1) zero, 2) a nominal value equal to Con Edison's 11 default residential tariff's connection charge, 3) the nominal value plus $0.33/day ($10/month), and 4) the nominal value plus $1.66/day ($50/month). Similar tariffs are being considered in practice to solve utilities' fixed cost recovery problem [8] . A total of nine types of tariffs are compared in this section. We describe their main characteristics in Table I . Generally, in our analyses, for each type of tariff and a given net revenue requirement F , we optimize the non-fixed parameters of the 11 The largest distribution utility by number of customers in New York State. a Types of tariffs associated to Pareto fronts in Fig. 2 (base case) . b Types of tariffs associated to Pareto fronts in Fig. 3(a) tariff type to solve the tariff design problem (4), and conduct a parametric analysis over F . This case study uses the same demand model as in part I [1] , which comprises a linear demand function and a quadratic utility function for each customer. We use publicly available energy sales data and rates from Con Edison for the Summer of 2015 to fit the demand model. Con Edison's default tariff for most of its 2.2 million residential retail customers is essentially a two-part tariff T CE with a flat price of π CE k = 17.2 cents/kWh (for k = 1, . . . , 24) and a connection charge of $15.76/month (A CE = $0.53/day). We use day-ahead wholesale prices for NYC from NYISO.
A. Base Case
This is the case without DERs and nominal tariff T CE . Throughout the case study, we assume an average price elasticity of the cumulative daily demand of ε(π CE ) = −0.3 at π CE , which is a reasonable estimate of the short-term own-price elasticity of electricity demand [30] . Moreover, assuming a total of M = 2.2 million residential customers, we use the tariff T CE to compute the utility's average daily residential revenue and the portion of this revenue that contributes towards the utility's fixed costs. The former quantity amounts to rev(T CE ) = $7.19 million (M) dollars and the latter to
For the sake of brevity, the details of these computations already described in part I [1] are not reproduced here. Fig. 2 , which is introduced and discussed in part I [1] , illustrates five Pareto fronts. Therein, each curve corresponds to a type of two-part tariff. Intuitively, similar to Fig. 1 , the vertical axis represents the expected retailer surplus (rs or F ), and the horizontal axis represents the expected consumer surplus (cs). In particular, we plot the Pareto front associated to each type of tariff by first, for each of many evenly spaced values of F within certain interval, obtaining tariff parameters (π, A) that solve the tariff design problem (4) . Then, each tariff T or pair (π, A) is used to compute the induced (expected) consumer surplus cs 0 (T ) and retailer surplus rs 0 (T ), yielding a single point (cs 0 (T ), rs 0 (T )). Finally, instead of plotting each of these points in an absolute frame of reference, we use a relative frame of reference where the point (cs 0 (T CE ), rs 0 (T CE )) = (9.54, 5.83) (in USD million) is used as the origin. That is, all computed pairs (cs 0 (T ), rs 0 (T )) are plotted in terms of their distance from the benchmark point (cs 0 (T CE ), rs 0 (T CE )), namely, as (cs 0 (T ) − cs 0 (T CE ), rs 0 (T ) − rs 0 (T CE )). Hence, Fig. 2 illustrates the expected surplus changes induced by a type tariff relative to those induced by Con Edison's default tariff. The axes with normalized values (i.e., lower horizontal and left vertical), which are meant to highlight the significant scale of the surplus changes plotted, are simply normalized versions of the corresponding axes (i.e., upper horizontal and right vertical) normalized by Con Edison's gross revenue rev(T CE ) = $7.19 M.
The five types of tariffs characterized by their Pareto fronts in Fig. 2 are described in Table I in the same vertical order, from top to bottom, as they appear in the figure and the legend. This set of types is rather broad in the sense that it captures most tariffs used in practice. On one extreme, tariff type #9 is the simplest possible tariff since it is characterized by a single parameter, a flat rate. On the other extreme, the optimal twopart tariff is the most complex tariff since it is characterized by N + 1 parameters, all of which are optimized to maximize the expected consumer surplus. Most tariffs used in the U.S. for residential customers fall somewhere in between these two types of tariffs, including Con Edison's default tariff. As discussed in part I [1] , tariff type #7 is the type used by Con Edison.
We make some observations from Fig. 2 . First, the −1 slope of the Pareto front associated to the optimal two-part tariff T * corroborates that the induced efficiency sw(T * ) does not depend on F . Conversely, the larger the F , the more inefficient the suboptimal two-part tariffs considered become. This can be seen from the non-unitary slopes exhibited by all tariffs except T * . Second, at the nominal rs target F CE (i.e., the horizontal axis), significant differences in the induced cs gains are observed among the tariffs. In particular, moving from flat prices to hourly prices improves cs by approximately 1% ($72k/day). A more significant cs gain (8.1%) is brought by also increasing the connection charge to the optimal level (which amounts to A * = $2.65/day or $79.5/month). Conversely, decreasing the connection charge to zero reduces cs by 4.8%. These empirical computations suggest that additional fixed costs can be recovered more efficiently by increasing connection charges than by pricing more dynamically.
B. Tariff Structure and Net Benefits of DERs
We now analyze the combined impact of tariff structure and DER integration on consumers' surplus. We measure changes in cs relative to cs 0 (T CE ) and normalized by rev(T CE ).
1) Customer-Integrated DERs: We start by estimating changes in cs as a function of the solar and battery storage aggregate capacity integrated by customers. The tariffs here considered are applied to the hourly net metered demand, so they differ from existing net metering tariffs with rolling credit. Moreover, we model the integration of renewable resources using hourly solar PV generation data from a simulated 5kW-DC-capacity rooftop system located in NYC. 12 Similarly, we model the integration of distributed energy storage resources using the basic specifications of a commercially available lithium-ion battery 13 Notably, we model charging and discharging rate constraints and inefficiencies, which require linear constraints additional to those included in the stylized storage model defined by U(θ) in (5) . We integrate as many systems as necessary to reach a specified level of capacity.
In Fig. 3(a) we plot the Pareto fronts associated to three types of tariffs (#1, #6, #7) and three decentralized solar PV integration levels. This figure is a zoomed-out version of Fig. 2 , but computed for three DER integration levels. As such, it gives a rough intuition of how decentralized DERs transform the Pareto fronts of different tariff structures. In general, horizontal differences between the Pareto fronts represent changes in consumer surplus due to different tariff structures and/or levels of decentralized DER integration. Evidently, for any fixed level of retail surplus F , the presence of decentralized DERs causes consumer surplus to increase when moving from the flat tariff type #7 to the optimal two-part tariff T * DEC . Fig. 3 (a) also shows that, at rs(T ) = F CE , consumer surplus decreases with the integration of DERs under the flat tariff type #7 or under the dynamic tariff type #6. To better understand the effect of the integration of DERs on the consumer surplus under different types of tariffs, we present the following parametric analysis over the decentralized DER integration level, while holding fixed the retail net revenue requirement at rs(T ) = F CE .
In Fig. 4(a) , for all nine tariff types, we plot the normalized cs gains (or, equivalently, the sw gains) caused by increments in the PV capacity integrated by customers and the concomitant Fig. 4 . In each figure, nine curves show the expected consumer surplus gains and losses (or social surplus) induced by increasing amounts of solar-plusbattery capacity under nine different types of tariffs (see Table I ). Gains and losses are measured relative to base case with tariff T CE and no DERs integration. adjustments to the tariff required to re-optimize it. The storage capacity integrated is assumed to be half the PV capacity.
In particular, Fig. 4(a) shows how integrating decentralized DERs can trigger both efficiency gains and losses depending on the tariff structure and type. For example, the curve for the flat tariff with nominal connection charge (type #7) suggests that maintaining revenue adequacy with flat rate increments would cause DERs to bring no significant net gains or losses in cs and sw for small levels of integration. However, DER integration levels beyond 500 MW would bring increasingly larger losses in cs and sw of 1.3% at 1.1 GW and 15% at 2 GW. A similar performance is shown by the two-part tariff with nominal connection charge (type #6). The gain of 1% it yields with no DER adoption vanishes to 0% at 1.1 GW of PV, after which this type of tariff starts to induce net efficiency losses. The two-part tariffs with connection charges fixed at values higher than the nominal (namely, types #4 and #2) bring efficiency gains of 2.8% and 7.7%, respectively, with no PV adoption. The gains brought by type #4 increase until reaching a maximum of 3.5% and then decrease after certain level of adoption. Type #2, on the other hand, brings gains that increase monotonically reaching 13.6% at the maximum PV capacity considered, namely 2.2 GW. Other example is the flat tariff with no connection charge, which starts with efficiency losses of 6.8% that increase sharply with the level of PV adoption up to 20.4% at 1.1 GW. Lastly, the optimal two-part tariff starts with an efficiency gain of 8.1%, and it lets customer-integrated DERs to generate their full value, which amounts to an additional 6.6% of efficiency at 2.2 GW or 3% per GW. In other terms, the efficiency gains foregone by using Con Edison's flat tariff type #7 rather than the optimal two-part tariff T * (type #1) grow linearly with the level of PV adoption and reach 29.3% (or $2.11 M/day) at 2 GW.
In summary, connection charges embody a method for fixed cost recovery that seems to be more effective than dynamic pricing. This is in the sense that connection charges alone can achieve at least 90% of the efficiency gains attained by the optimal two-part tariff (for all the integration levels considered). In sharp contrast, dynamic pricing alone can achieve at most 12.5% of the potential gains, and it entails efficiency losses for higher DER adoption levels. A word of caution on tariffs with high connection charges and lower flat prices, however, is that they induce customers to consume more on peak. Higher peak loads generally tend to increase the fixed costs faced by the retailer, and this is an endogenous effect not captured by our model. Such increases can come in the form of additional capital expenditures in infrastructure (needed to cope with the higher peak load) or in the form of higher ISO/RTO demand charges. To discourage problematic higher peak loads, retailers can use the combination of dynamic prices and high connection charges, such as the optimal two-part tariff. Alternatively, as suggested above, one can also consider a tariff design problem where the retailer faces additional costs that dependent on the coincident peak net-load. Such consideration leads to classical peak-load pricing formulations, which yield optimal dynamic prices with demand charges [6] .
2) Retailer-Integrated DERs: We now estimate changes in surplus as a function of the solar and battery storage capacity integrated by the retailer. For the sake of a fair comparison, DERs with the same characteristics as before are used.
In Fig. 4(b) , for several types of tariff, we plot the normalized gains in cs and sw caused by increments in the PV and storage capacity integrated (in a 2:1 ratio) by the retailer and the corresponding tariff updates required to maintain revenue adequacy. The figure reveals that the DERs bring monotonic surplus gains under all the tariffs considered. This is because the benefits brought by centralized DERs are not offset by the consumption inefficiencies induced by decentralized DERs. In fact, the inefficiencies induced by suboptimal tariffs without DERs are slightly mitigated by centralized DERs because these DERs help the retailer recover a small portion of F .
Hence, Fig. 4(b) suggests that the changes in cs and sw brought by retailer-integrated DERs are virtually unbiased by the type of tariff. This is unlike customer-integrated DERs whose effect on cs and sw is significantly biased by the type of tariff, and especially, by the reliance on retail price markups for fixed cost recovery, as it is evident in Fig. 4(a) . In other words, under tariffs with significant retail markups, while centralized DERs generally bring surplus gains, decentralized DERs tend to mitigate surplus gains or bring surplus losses. It also clear from Fig. 4 that dynamic pricing and higher connection charges help consistently (i.e., regardless the level of DER integration) to mitigate existing inefficiencies. Notably, connection charges seem to offer a much more effective measure to mitigate such inefficiencies than dynamic pricing.
C. Cross-Subsidies Induced by Net Metering
Considering the existing inequity and cross-subsidy concerns related to the use of net energy metering as a mechanism to compensate DERs [11, Sec. 9 .5], [12] , [18] , [31] , [32] , it is instructive to quantify the cross-subsidies induced by the tariffs studied in the previous section. Broadly, in electricity tariff design, cross-subsidies occur when the allocation of electric utilities' costs among (groups of) customers is not aligned with cost-causation. Typically, when cost-causation is not imposed for certain costs due to technological limitations or conflicting policy objectives, regulators aim at socializing such costs using tariffs that imply hopefully acceptable levels of cross-subsidies. In the case of solar distributed generation, net energy metering tariffs with high price markups can result in cross-subsidies favoring PV owners since the distribution utilities' infrastructure (fixed) costs that they avoid to pay (through reduced volumetric payments) end up being subsidized by non-PV owners. In this section, we estimate such cross-subsidies for different levels of customer-integrated solar PV capacity.
For a given tariff type and level of (decentralized) solar integration, the cross-subsidy is computed as follows. First, we obtain the contribution that PV owners make towards the fixed costs or net revenue requirement F under a net energy metering (NEM) setting. Second, we compute the contribution that PV owners would make towards the fixed costs F using the same type of tariff but under a non-NEM setting. Namely, a setting that settles net purchases and net sales (or exports) at separate prices. In particular, the non-NEM version of the tariff, which is also optimized subject to revenue adequacy, settles net purchases at an optimized price vector π and net sales at the wholesale prices λ. 14 Lastly, we compute the cross-subsidy as the difference between the two levels of contributions of PV owners towards the net revenue requirement F , normalized by F . Intuitively, this computation accounts for the difference between the fixed costs that PV owners should pay for and the fixed costs that they actually pay for, due to net metering.
The computation of cross-subsidies requires specifying individual demand functions and the distribution of solar capacity between customers. We consider a simple illustrative case. Customers have identical demand functions except for a scaling 14 Customer-integrated storage is not considered in this analysis because nonlinear tariffs combined with behind-the-meter storage make customers' problem fundamentally more complicated. parameter σ i satisfying σ i = i · σ for some σ > 0. The 5-kW solar installations are allocated to the largest consumers, who have the greatest incentive to invest in solar generation. The resulting inter-class cross-subsidies are depicted in Fig. 5 . Evidently, all tariffs induce non-zero cross-subsidies except for the optimal two-part tariff, which yields virtually no cross-subsidies (in spite of the discussion in Section II-B1). This is not entirely surprising since pricing according to π * DEC = λ is efficient and consistent with cost causality. This means that the optimal two-part tariff does not induce noticeable cross-subsidies driven by inefficient price distortions. However, they do induce some limited cross-subsidies through connection charges, and particularly, through the second term in (9) , which is rather small compared to the entire connection charge, A * . In other words, while cross-subsidies induced by uniform connection charges do not create inefficiencies (at least in the short-term), they can still raise inequity concerns. In contrast, the crosssubsidies of all the other tariffs increase with the integrated PV capacity, and they do it at an increasingly faster rate for flat tariffs.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We leverage the analytical framework developed in [1] to study how retail electricity tariff structure can distort the net benefits brought by DERs integrated by customers and their retailer. This work is an application of Ramsey pricing with extensions to accommodate the integration of DERs.
Our analysis offers several conclusions. First, while net metering tariffs that rely on flat and higher prices to maintain revenue adequacy provide increasingly stronger incentives for customers to integrate renewables, they induce increasingly larger crosssubsidies and consumption inefficiencies that can outweigh renewables' benefits. These significant inefficiencies have draw little attention in the literature compared to the cross-subsidies.
Second, net metering tariffs can achieve revenue adequacy without compromising efficiency by using marginal-cost-based dynamic prices and higher connection charges. These tariffs, however, provide little incentive to integrate renewables. Third, retailer-integrated DERs bring customers net benefits that are less dependent on tariff structure, and they cause no tariff feedback loops. As such, this alternative to behind-the-meter DERs seems worth exploring.
This study represents an initial point of analysis, for it has various limitations. First, policy objectives beyond efficiency and revenue sufficiency -often considered in practice-are here ignored. Practical criteria such as bill stability make "desirable" tariffs hard to be ever attained. Second, customer disconnections are assumed to be not plausible as a customer choice. This assumption becomes increasingly less realistic with the decline of DER costs. Third, retailer non-energy costs are assumed to be fixed and independent of the coincident (net) peak load. Relaxing this assumption leads to peak-load pricing formulations [33] . We discuss one such relaxation in [6] , where capacity costs are recovered with a demand charge applied to the net demand coincident with the peak period. Forth, the tariffs derived in this work remunerate the energy services provided by DERs, yet they disregard several other benefits (and costs) DERs have the potential to provide (or cause) primarily to the distribution system and the wholesale market. The rigorous incorporation of such potential benefits and costs into retail tariffs requires further investigation. Lastly, our numerical case study relies on a linear demand model derived from a consumer problem in [27] . Comparing different demand models against the linear demand model could help understanding the implications of using different demand modeling assumptions. V s (π, θ) ∈ R Arbitrage value of storage system. s * (π, θ) ∈ R N Optimal solution of storage problem (6) . d i ∈ R N Individual net-metered demand. ε kt (π)
Cross-time price elasticity of demand. T * , π * , A * Optimal two-part tariff and parameters. T † , π † Optimal linear tariff and retail price. T CE , π CE , A CE Con Edison's default tariff and parameters.
PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 1: Solving rs(T ) = F in (4) for A and substituting in the objective cs(T ) yields
where sw 0 (T ) = cs 0 (T ) + rs 0 (T ) denotes the expected total surplus that T would induce in the absence of DERs. It suffices to show that sw 0 (T ) and each term E[λ s * (π, θ i )] is maximized over π by π * DEC = λ if ∇ π D(π, ω) and λ are uncorrelated. Indeed, under said condition, π * DEC = λ follows from the first order condition (FOC) ∇ π sw 0 (T ) = 0. Assumption 1 implies sw 0 (T ) is strictly concave in π (Prop. 4 in [1] ), which guarantees the uniqueness and optimality of (A * DEC , π * DEC ). A * DEC in (9) is obtained by solving rs(T * DEC ) = F . The proof is completed since for each i and all π ∈ R N , E[λ s * (π, θ i )] ≤ λ s * (λ, θ i ) = V S (λ, θ i ). 
Proof of
Verifying that q i (T * DEC , ω i ) ≡ D i (λ, ω i ) and s i (λ, θ i ) are optimal for the social planner's problem on the right-hand-side of (15) completes the proof since T * DEC (in the left-hand-side) achieves this upper bound.
Proof of Theorem 3: With affine tariffs and centralized DERs, we have that cs i (T ) = cs i 0 (T ) is computed as in (1) and rs(T ) as in (11) . These expressions make problem (4), with paramater F , equivalent to that without any DERs and parameterF := 
Applying Thm. 1 in [1] to (16) yields the tariff T * CEN .
